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Traffic Signals — October 2025

TRAFFIC SIGNALS NEWSLETTER

Dear Colleagues,November 7, 2025

This newsletter sets out a summary of Ohio court decisions issued in October, 2025, concerning impaired driving, alcohol and drugs of abuse, and other procedural related issues that may be raised in these cases. While not all of the cases involve impaired driving, they raise pretrial and post-judgment issues that would apply to OVI and vehicular homicide and assault cases.

The case summaries provide recent appellate decisions regarding Ohio law as applied to factual matters as well as interpretations and application of statutes and prior case law. Some cases also set out specific facts situations for determining reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause which may be of assistance when reviewing motions to suppress.

I am grateful to Paul Pfeifer, Trina Bennington, and the Ohio Judicial Conference staff for their assistance in the distribution of the newsletter. Please feel free to call or email me with any feedback.

Patrick Carroll, retired judge

Ohio Judicial Outreach Liaison to the ABA

[email protected]

(216) 403-5521

OVI issues.

Field sobriety tests

State v. Pelfrey, 2025-Ohio-4896 (12^th. Dist.). An order overruling a motion to suppress and convictions for OVI and failure to control were affirmed. While driving home from a Christmas family gathering with his three minor children, the defendant swerved off the road and overturned into a ditch. Witnesses at the scene, including another driver that was cut off by the defendant, told the police the defendant was very drunk. Based on the alcohol odor from the defendant, glassy eyes, inability to follow directions, and admission that he had a few shots at the party, the officer administered field sobriety tests. From the test results the defendant was arrested for OVI. After a motion to suppress was overruled, the defendant was found guilty after a trial.

1. Reasonable Suspicion to Conduct Field Sobriety Tests

Reasonable and articulable suspicion is verified by evaluating the totality of the circumstances "through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” (Par. 17, citations omitted.). Factors to support a reasonable suspicion of impairment include, odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, flushed face, slurred speech, erratic driving, diminished coordination, demeanor of the driver, and admission of alcohol consumption. While there may be non-impairment reasons for a specific condition, such as the defendant's eyes to be bloodshot or glassy, this does not diminish the relevance of these factors for the question of whether the officer reasonably suspected the defendant was intoxicated. (Par. 18). In the present case there were a number of factors to create a reasonable suspicion of intoxication to justify administering field sobriety tests to the defendant.

2. Field sobriety tests.

The defendant argued the field sobriety tests were not conducted in substantial compliance with the applicable NHTSA standards. The defendant filed a “boilerplate” motion to suppress, making only general allegations of noncompliance. On cross examination of the officer, however, the defendant raised the specificity of the evidence required by the State to meet its burden by asking specific questions on the administration of the field sobriety tests. (Par. 30).

For the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, although the officer did not ask the defendant if he had a head injury from the crash, the court noted the officer asked the defendant generally if he was injured and the defendant did not complain of any injuries. The test was conducted in the rain, but the officer testified it was a steady mist, not a downpour, and did not interfere with the movement of the defendant’s eyes. (Par. 31).

Regarding the walk and turn and one leg stand tests, the NHTSA manual provides the test should be conducted on reasonably dry pavement. The court found, however, there was no evidence the wet pavement interfered with the test. (Par. 33). The court recognized that field sobriety tests are often performed under less than ideal circumstances, but the weather or street conditions by themselves does not show lack of substantial compliance with the administration of the tests. (Par. 33, citations omitted.). Moreover, requiring ideal conditions would effectively require strict, rather than substantial compliance with the NHTSA manual. (Pr. 33).

State v. Taylor, 2025-Ohio-4645, (5^th. Dist.). OVI conviction affirmed. The defendant was stopped for driving a vehicle with fictitious plates. Based on the officer’s observations of possible impairment, the defendant performed field sobriety tests. From the officer’s observation of the standardized field sobriety tests, along with divided attention tests and the defendant’s dilated pupils, eye tremors, and other signs of impairment, the defendant was arrested for OVI. The defendant was found guilty by a jury trial.

Evans factors.

On appeal the defendant asserted the conviction was not supported by the evidence based on the factors set out in State v. Evans, 127 Ohio App.3d 56 (11th Dist. 1988). The court noted, however, that the Evans test sets out factors for determining whether there is a reasonable suspicion to have a driver take the field sobriety tests.¹ It is not a standard to determine sufficiency of evidence to support an OVI conviction. The appellate court found there was sufficient evidence presented at trial which, if believed by the jury, supported the OVI conviction.

Traffic stop.

The license plate on the defendant’s car was registered to a different car. R.C. 4549.08(A) prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a fictitious license plate on a public road or highway. Based on the officer’s observations of a traffic violation, there was probable cause for the traffic stop.

Supporting evidence

State v. Hobson, 2025-Ohio-4901 (3d Dist). An order overruling a motion to suppress and convictions for felony OVI, harassment with a bodily substance, and failure to stop after an

accident were affirmed. The defendant ran a red light and crashed into another car that was making a left hand turn to go the opposite direction. Airbags were deployed and there was substantial damages to both cars. The defendant did not give any identification and drove away before anyone responded to the collision. There was testimony from numerous witnesses that just prior to the crash there was a popping sound which later turned out to be from the defendant hitting cones in the street as she approached the intersection.

The defendant’s car was located at the defendant’s home with corresponding damage. The defendant came to the door eating a chalupa and told the officer she left because the officer’s delay to get to the scene. The office noticed alcohol on the defendant’s breath slow and drawn out speech, and bloodshot and glassy eyes. The defendant refused a breath test and was arrested for OVI. While being put into the police car the defendant spat in the officer’s face. At the station the defendant refused the breathalyzer, admitting she had consumed a 24 ounce Four Loko prior to the collision. After the defendant’s motion to suppress was overruled, the case proceeded to jury trial. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges.

Probable cause for OVI arrest.

When determining whether an officer had probable cause for an OVI arrest, the issue is whether, at the moment of arrest, the officer had sufficient information, derived from a

reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, sufficient to cause a

prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving under the influence."  (Par. 34, citations omitted.). Overruling the motion to suppress, the trial court outlined the specific facts relied upon to determine the officer had probable cause for the defendant’s OVI arrest. Most of the facts were not disputed. The court noted any redness in the defendant’s eyes could not be seen in the body camera video, but based on the limitations of body cameras compared to the officer’s person's actual view, training, and experience, the trial court found the officer’s testimony to be credible. (Par. 31). Reviewing all the facts and circumstances the evidence supported a finding of probable cause for the arrest.

Evidence to support OVI conviction.

The defendant asserted the evidence was not sufficient to support the OVI conviction. The record shows the defendant had consumed alcohol was supported by both the odor of alcohol on her breath and her own admission. The court noted “the law does not prohibit driving after drinking alcohol; instead, it prohibits driving when impaired by alcohol.” State v. Hopp, 2016-Ohio-8027 (9th Dist.). (Par. 46.). The defendant need not be “falling down drunk” to be appreciably impaired by alcohol. (Par. 51). The issue is not a threshold level of alcohol concentration in the defendant's body, but whether the defendant operated a vehicle when his/her faculties were appreciably impaired by the consumption of alcohol. State v. Sullivan, 2017 Ohio-8937 (3d Dist.). (Par. 47, other citations omitted.). In the present case there were several witnesses who testified the defendant was intoxicated, as compared to having merely ingested a minimal amount of alcohol. (Par. 48). Reviewing all of the evidence, including the defendant’s erratic driving, the court affirmed the conviction.

Jury instructions.

State v. Gooch, 2025-Ohio-4595. (10^th. Dist.). OVI conviction affirmed. The defendant failed to stop for a red light, resulting in a three car collision at the intersection. The defendant was initially charged with OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and after the results of a urine test, also charged in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(i) (per se violation over alcohol level). The defendant was convicted of both offenses and the offenses were merged as allied offenses of similar import. The issue on appeal was the jury instructions.

Although both OVI offenses were based on alcohol consumption, the trial court instructed the jury on both alcohol and drugs of abuse. There was no evidence of drug use or impairment. After the instructions were read to the jury, the instructions were amended to delete some of the reference to drugs of abuse for the written version that was provided to the jury. The trial court did not verbally re-do the instructions without reference to drugs of abuse or provide a curative instruction.

Jury instruction reference to drugs of abuse.

1. Per se charge²

The instructions referred to both alcohol and drugs of abuse. An alternate means case is when a single offense may be committed in more than one way. While the jury must unanimously decide the element of an offense, the jurors may differ on the evidence in support of the element. State v. Gardner, 2008-Ohio-2787, citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 817 (1999). (Par. 27). There must be sufficient evidence to support each charged alternative means upon which the jury was instructed, so that a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rawson, 2016-Ohio-1403 (10^th. Dist.), citing Gardner. (emphasis in the original).

The defendant asserted on appeal the reference to drugs of abuse presented an alternative means of committing the OVI offenses, denying him the right to a unanimous verdict. The court agreed there was no evidence of drug usage and the reference to drugs in the jury instructions was incorrect. The court further noted, however, that R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(i) related solely and specifically to alcohol. (Par. 30). The per se charge, based on the urine test results for alcohol, was not an alternate means charge. The evidence presented by the prosecutor only involved alcohol use and the case was tried to the jury on the defendant’s alcohol level based on the urine test.

Affirming the conviction the court noted there was no evidence presented of any drug use. The trial court instructed the jury that the issue was whether the defendant had a concentration of .238 of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per [100 ml] of his urine. Therefore, the only way to arrive at a guilty verdict was based on alcohol consumption only. The single reference to drugs of abuse in the final sentence of the jury instructions regarding OVI (per se) did not create a question about jury unanimity, did not affect substantial rights, and did not amount to plain error.

2. Under the influence charge.

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) is an alternate means case because a finding of guilt could be based on impairment by alcohol, drugs of abuse, or a combination of the two. In this case, even though the case was based solely on alcohol use, the trial court defined the term “drug of abuse’ and instructed that the jury could consider evidence of the urine test, "along with all other evidence in determining whether the defendant was or was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse." (Par. 34, emphasis added by the court.).

The court found the jury instructions on the OVI (impaired) offense were erroneous because the case focused solely on alcohol. The instructions implied to the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of violating R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) by of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs of abuse, creating the potential for a non-unanimous verdict. (Par. 34). Although the instructions were incorrect, reversal was not required because the jury found the defendant guilty of both OVI offenses and the offense of driving while impaired was merged for sentencing with the per se offense as allied offenses of similar import. (Par. 40).

Jury instruction – Omission of “under the influence” definition.

A trial court is required to separately and specifically charge the jury on every element of each crime with which a defendant is charged. In this case the trial court omitted the definition of “under the influence of alcohol.” The appellate court also found the omission erroneous, but was not grounds for reversal as the defendant was also found guilty of the per se violation which related to alcohol level by weight, not impairment. As such, “under the influence of alcohol” was not an element of the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(i) (per se) charge.

Sentencing issues

1. Failure to Appear

State v. Shanks, 2025-Ohio-4604 (2d. Dist.). Convictions for aggravated possession of drugs, failure to appear, and OVI were affirmed. While on pretrial release, the defendant tested positive for fentanyl, THC, methamphetamine, and amphetamine. The defendant failed to appear for a pretrial conference and a warrant was issued. Additional drug and OVI charges, as well as a charge for failure to appear was filed by a subsequent indictment. Upon arrest and return to Ohio, the defendant plead guilty to aggravated possession of drugs (F5), operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drug of abuse (M1), and failure to appear as required by recognizance (F4).

At the sentencing hearing the trial court read an anonymous postcard that had been sent to the judge from Florida where the defendant was living after she fled from court. During the hearing the defendant interrupted the prosecutor and was admonished by the judge. When given an opportunity to speak, the defendant criticized the prosecutor. The defendant asserted on appeal the trial court should not have considered a statement she made to the prosecutor during the sentencing hearing and the unsigned postcard from Florida.

On appeal the court held R.C. 2929.12 sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that must be considered to determine the seriousness of the crime and the likelihood of recidivism, but does not limit factors that a trial court may consider when fashioning an appropriate sentence. (Par. 16). In this case the postcard and the defendant’s courtroom outburst questioned whether the defendant had improved her decision-making and was ready to move past her long-time criminality. (Par. 17). The court noted the defendant had been argumentative with the police when initially arrested and the court outburst was a continuation of that conduct.

Affirming the sentence, the appellate court distinguished State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, in which the sentence was increased when the defendant interrupted the trial court during sentencing with a profanity laced tirade. In Bryant the sentence was based in part on the defendant’s open disrespect for the court while in the present case the outburst, which was far milder, directly related to the risk of recidivism.

State v. Rivera, 2025-Ohio-4881 (2d. Dist.). Conviction and sentencing for OVI, endangering children, tampering with evidence, and possession of a fentanyl-related compound were affirmed. The defendant was stopped after driving erratically, nearly striking multiple vehicles and hitting a mailbox with her child in the car. The defendant plead guilty to the charges. The trial court held the sentencing hearing by video due to the defendant’s enrollment in a treatment program. The court orally imposed concurrent sentences for all four convictions, with a total of thirty six months in prison. The court informed the defendant that he would hold off signing the judgment until she reported to jail the following day.

Instead of complying with the court order, the defendant self-checked herself out of the treatment program and did not report to jail. A warrant was issued and the defendant was arrested three years later. The court modified its prior oral sentencing order and imposed the fentanyl possession offense consecutive with the other offenses resulting in a forty eight month prison term. The sentence was reduced to writing and filed with the clerk of court as the judgment of the court.

On appeal the defendant asserted an unreasonable delay in sentencing divested the court’s jurisdiction. Although a trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment, when there has been no journalization of a criminal sentence, a sentence announced in open court may be amended without a formal judgment entry. (Par. 8, citations omitted.).

The court recognized that an unreasonable delay between plea and sentencing may be grounds for dismissal, factors include the length of the delay, whether the court was aware of the defendant’s location, defendant’s to appear in court due to incarceration, and actions available to the court for the defendant brought to court for sentencing or alternate methods, such as video appearance when the defendant is elsewhere incarcerated. (Par. 10-12). In the present case the court found the court was not aware of the defendant’s location and the defendant made no attempt to notify the court. In addition, the sentencing delay was due solely to the defendant’s own conduct.

Author’s Note: Ohio Superintendence Rule 39(B)(4) states,  “Provided the defendant in a criminal case is available, the court shall impose sentence or hold a sentencing hearing with all parties present within fifteen days of the verdict or finding of guilt or receipt of a completed pre-sentence investigation report.” 

2. Felony sentencing.

State v. Hockwatter, 2025-Ohio-4928 (6^th. Dist.). Felony OVI conviction affirmed but reversed and remanded for resenting. The defendant was convicted of OVI as a fourth degree felony in addition to the repeat OVI offender specification under R.C. 2941.1413. The defendant was sentence to eighteen months in prison with the first 120 days of mandatory time and a mandatory one year in prison on the OVI specification for total incarceration of two and one half years.

The OVI sentencing scheme for a third or fourth felony offense is confusing as it involves the interplay of three separate statutes, R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d), R.C. 2929.13(G), and R.C. 2941.1413. Unlike most criminal offenses, OVI offenses have separate penalties under R.C. 4511.19(G) which must be read in conjunction with the general criminal penalties in R.C. 2929.13. The application of these to statute differ because the defendant was also convicted of an OVI specification under R.C. 2941.1413.

The defendant was convicted of a fourth degree OVI offenses having five prior convictions within twenty years. R.C. 4511.19 and R.C. 2929.13 read together, depending on whether the defendant submitted to a chemical test and the test results level, the trial court may sentence the defendant to a mandatory 60 or 120 days in either prison or local jail, as opposed to other fourth degree felony convictions. When, however, the defendant is also convicted of an OVI specification under R.C. 2941.1413, the 60/120 day option is not available. A conviction of the OVI specification carries a mandatory 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 year required prison term.

In the present case because the defendant was also convicted of the OVI specification with a mandatory prison term, the 120 day provision under R.C. 2929.13(G) and R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d) did not apply. Although the overall sentence was within the statutory framework, the case was remanded to resolve the conflicting statutory provisions in the sentencing entry.

Traffic stops and drug odors.

A sniff is just a sniff (Odor alone is not sufficient probable cause for search)

1. Smell of marijuana.

State v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-4607 (1^st. Dist.). An order granting a suppression motion of a search based solely on the odor of marijuana was affirmed. The defendant was stopped on a reported warrant listed to the vehicle he was driving. The officer smelled marijuana when she asked the defendant to get out of the car. The defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of the police car. A gun and drugs were found in the car and the defendant was arrested.

On the motion to suppress the trial court found the traffic stop was valid based on the outstanding warrant, but granted the motion, finding:

1) Because the defendant had been immediately removed from the vehicle, handcuffed, and not within reaching distance of the vehicle, the vehicle could not have been searched incident to arrest.

2) The presence of burnt marijuana in the vehicle did not justify the search.

A vehicle search for officer safety is only justified when it has been determined that the detained individual will be returning to the vehicle. (Par. 40, citations omitted.). The appellate court found at the time the car was searched there had been no decision whether the defendant would be permitted to reenter the vehicle. With the defendant secured in a back of a police car away from his own car, there were no issue of officer safety to justify the search. (Par. 40, citations omitted.).

The trial court held and the appellate court affirmed that the odor of marijuana, by itself, was not sufficient to justify a search of the car. In this case there was no evidence that the defendant was smoking marijuana in the vehicle or was under the influence of marijuana when stopped. In State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, the Ohio Supreme Court held “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” The appellate court in Gray, however, noted that Moore was decided when all marijuana was illegal and questioned the continued validity of the holding in Moore. (Par. 46-47). The court analogized the smell of marijuana alone to the smell of alcohol, which by itself would not be reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop . (Par. 51.).

The court noted the smell of marijuana could be a relevant factor under the totality of the circumstances in a probable-cause analysis. (Par. 62). In the present case, however, it was the sole basis for the search of the car, which the court held was legally insufficient.

Author’s note: Cases involving marijuana odor may vary based on the appellate district, the type of marijuana as either raw or burnt, the date of the incident with recreational marijuana becoming conditionally permitted as of December 7, 2023, the scope and extent of the search, and other factors present as part of the totality of the circumstances.

2. Canine drug alert.

State v. Bayman, 2025-Ohio-4600 (2d. Dist.). A conviction for aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine) was reversed based on vehicle search. The defendant was stopped based on information that the registered vehicle owner had an active warrant. The defendant was in the back seat of the car. The vehicle owner was not present. While the occupants remained in the car, the officer walked a drug canine around the car and the dog alerted to the odor of illegal narcotics at the driver's front door.

Based on the dog sniff, the defendant was ordered out of the car. In response to whether there was anything in his pants that would injure the officer for a pat down, the defendant gave the officer a syringe that was in his pocket. In doing so, there was partial exposure of a plastic bag in the defendant’s pocket containing 38.33 grams of methamphetamine.

On appeal the court noted "[t]he authority to stop an individual does not necessarily equate to authority to search the individual." (Par. 17, Citations omitted.) A protective pat down under Terry is limited in scope to its protective purpose and cannot be employed by the searching officer to search for evidence of crime. State v. Holley, 2004-Ohio-4264, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). In this case the K-9 alert to drugs in the car was limited to a search of the car, not the passengers and the officer lacked probable cause to search the defendant based solely on the K-9 alert. (Par. 25).

Continued detention of traffic stop.

State v. Martinez, 2025-Ohio-4786 (12^th. Dist.). Conviction for illegal possession of marijuana was affirmed. The defendant/driver was seen by an officer driving too close to another car and as the officer pulled up next to the defendant, the defendant turned his head to his shoulder to conceal his face. The defendant moved over to the middle lane of the highway and slowed down, causing other traffic behind him to slow down. The defendant was stopped by the officer and in response to a request to see the vehicle registration, was given a rental agreement from Oregon in the name of some other person. The defendant told the officer he was visiting an uncle in West Virginia and decided to drive instead of fly because he wanted to see the country.

The officer noticed the defendant seemed nervous. During this conversation a canine unit was dispatched. The dog alerted on the defendant’s car and the defendant told the officer there was a large quantity of marijuana in the car. The subsequent search discovered fifty one pounds of marijuana. After denial of the motion to suppress, the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana.

Duration of the traffic stop

On appeal the defendant did not dispute the traffic stop,³ but asserted the detention was unreasonably delayed for the drug dog sniff. An officer may detain a person for a traffic violation only for the time necessary to effectuate the purpose for which the stop was made. This includes, however, the time necessary to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates. State v. Hernandez, 2007-Ohio-5190 (12^th. Dist.). (Par. 17). The detention may continue beyond this time frame when additional facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop. During this time period a vehicle may be subjected to a canine sniff of the vehicle's exterior even without the presence of a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity. (Par. 18). A canine sniff of the exterior of the car is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Par. 18).

In the present case the court found the defendant was not unreasonably detained. The defendant has a Washington State driver’s license and was driving a rental car from Oregon in someone else’s name. Due to the out of state license and renal agreement, the dog arrived and conducted the sniff before the officer had completed his investigation on the traffic stop. (Par. 19).

Proof of marijuana.

The defendant also argued on appeal lack of sufficient evidence, asserting the state did not prove the cargo was marijuana and not hemp. Marijuana and hemp look similar and have the same odor. Two criminalists with the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Laboratory tested, weighed, and analyzed the bags recovered from the defendant’s car finding the contents tested were above .3 percent THC. (Par. 9). Although the report did not include the amount of THCA for each sample tested, but only the final amount of THC, the court found the testing methods were a matter of credibility, not admissibility. Moreover, one of the criminologists testified she could determine whether the sample was hemp or marijuana.

Author’s note: Despite the Adult Cannabis Act, R.C. Chap. 3780, marijuana remains illegal under federal law and possession is conditionally permitted in Ohio. Possession restrictions include:

• 21 years or older.

• Maximum 2.5 ounces.

• Must be purchased from Ohio dispensary or home grown.

• May not consume:

  • in a moving motor vehicle, or

  • on local, state or federal public property.

Non-compliance with any of these conditions is a drug offense under R.C. 2925.03, R.C. 2925.04, and/or R.C. 2925.11. See also, R.C. 3780.99.

State v. Davis, 2025-Ohio-4620 (12^th. Dist.). An order overruling a motion to suppress and conviction for aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine) was affirmed. The officer made a traffic stop when he saw the defendant’s vehicle stop at a stop sign with the front wheels positioned past the stop bar painted on the road. In response to the officer’s inquiry whether there was anything illegal in the car, the defendant opened a lunch box and handed marijuana to the officer. The defendant had an expired marijuana card. A silver capsule like container with crystal meth was also found in the lunch box. The defendant was charged with drug possession and the traffic infraction. A motion to suppress was overruled and the defendant entered a no contest plea to the drug charge.

Initial stop.

On appeal the defendant argued the stop bar line was too faded to provide an objective reason to stop the vehicle. At the suppression hearing the defendant had presented photos showing the faded condition of the stop bar. From the photos the appellate court noted the stop line was sufficiently visible. (Par. 18). The court also noted that the critical inquiry was not whether a traffic violation actually occurred, but whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis for believing a violation occurred. (Par. 19, citation omitted.). R.C. 4511.43(A) requires a driver to "stop at a clearly marked stop line" when one exists. In this case the front wheels of the defendant’s car crossed that line, providing an objectively reasonable basis for the stop.

Continued detention.

At the stop the defendant initially denied any illegal items in the car before he opened the lunchbox. The court found the defendant’s evasive behavior gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the stop. (Par. 26, citations omitted.). The court also noted the scope of the search was appropriately limited to areas where contraband might reasonably be concealed. (Par. 31).

Author’s note: Although not addressed in this case, marijuana remains an illegal, schedule I drug of abuse under federal law. Ohio’s laws conditionally permit possession of medical or non-medical, adult use marijuana. Because the defendant in this case had an expired medical marijuana card, possession of the discovered marijuana was illegal under Ohio law due to lack of compliance with the state imposed conditions as well as federal law.

State v. Perry, 2025-Ohio-4945 (5^th. Dist.). An order overruling a motion to suppress and convictions for firearms and drug offenses was affirmed. The defendant was stopped by the officer for illegal window tint. At the car the officer saw a rolled marijuana joint in the center console, but did not smell any marijuana or see any other drug paraphernalia.⁴ The defendant admitted the cigarette was marijuana and he did not have a marijuana card. A search of the car discovered a satchel type bag with multiple baggies of prescription pills, suspected methamphetamine, suspected cocaine, and what appeared to be a loaded firearm. After a motion to suppress was overruled, the defendant entered a no contest plea to the charges.

On appeal, the court found the traffic stop was valid due to the improperly tinted windows, even if a traffic citation was not issued. Upon seeing the marijuana cigarette, the officer had an independent and reasonable articulable suspicion that the car contained illegal substances.

Citing State v Gordon, 2014-Ohio-5027 (5th Dist.), the court noted evidence in plain view in a vehicle may be seized when:

1) the initial intrusion that afforded the officer the plain view was lawful,

2) the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent, and

3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent to the officer.

(Par. 38). The court further found even though it was not immediately apparent that the cigarette contained marijuana due to the lack of any discernable odor, from the officer’s training and experience he was able to identify the substance was marijuana.

Miscellaneous.

1. Intervention in Lieu and traffic charge.

State v. Schneider, 2025-Ohio-4625 (12^th. Dist.). An order denying the defendant’s request for intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC) was affirmed. The defendant was charged with failure to comply with a lawful order of the police. The incident involved a sixteen minute high speed chase with the defendant driving more than 70 mph in a 35-mph speed zone while disregarding numerous traffic lights and driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Due to the mandatory license suspension upon conviction of this charge, the defendant was not eligible for ILC under R.C. 2951.041(B)(10). Upon denial of ILC, the defendant entered a no contest plea to the charged and raised the eligibility issue on appeal.

The defendant was charged under R.C. 2921.331(B), a fourth degree felony, which includes a mandatory driver’s license suspension of three years to life. R.C. 2921.331(E).⁵ Under R.C. 29510.041(B)(10), a defendant is not eligible to participate in ILC when the offense would disqualify the defendant under R.C. Chap. 4506 “from operating a commercial motor vehicle or would subject the offender to any other sanction under that chapter.”

The court noted in order to obtain a commercial driver’s license in Ohio, a person must have a valid driver’s license. R.C. 4506.06(A). Because the defendant in this case was charged with an offense that would result in the offender being disqualified" under R.C. Chapter 4506 "from operating a commercial motor vehicle,” she was statutorily ineligible to participate in ILC.

2. Sentencing and speed violation.

State v. Gingerich, 2025-Ohio-****, (3d. Dist.). Thirty day sentence for third offense speeding violation was affirmed. The defendant was charged with speeding, a third degree misdemeanor due to three prior speeding convictions within the last year. R.C.4511.23(P)(1)(c).⁶ The defendant plead no contest and a sixty day jail sentence was imposed with thirty days suspended. The defendant was remanded for the balance of the jail sentence.

On appeal the defendant argued the sentence was disproportionable to other offenses as a “nonviolent and relatively minor" speeding offense. Although the appellate court noted the sentence seemed harsh, the sentence was within the statutory range. (Par. 14). The court further noted, however, that the defendant had an extensive history of traffic offenses. Although the trial court did not expressly refer to the misdemeanor sentencing principles under R.C. 2929.21 and 2929.22, from the trial court’s comments in the record, the appellate court concluded the trial court properly considered the statutory criteria when it imposed the sentence.

The concurring opinion recognized that the sentence was within the statutory penalty range, but a thirty day jail sentence for a fully employed father of two young children seemed harsh for a violation of eleven miles over the speed limit. The concurring opinion further noted “Just because a court can impose a certain sentence, does not mean that it should.” The concurring opinion noted that no one was injured or put at risk and the sentence exceeded a first or second OVI offense.

3. Failure to comply and level of offense.

State v. Fails, 2025-Ohio-4680 (2d. Dist.). Conviction for failure to comply with a lawful police order in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) was affirmed, but amended from a third degree felony to a first degree misdemeanor.⁷ The police were called after the defendant refused to leave a store after coming into the store multiple times and photographing the store. When the officer arrived, the defendant was in his car in the parking lot. The officer yelled to the defendant that he wanted to talk to the defendant. Instead, the defendant began driving slowly.

Although the defendant was told to park his car, he continued toward the parking lot exit. A truck going the other way forced the defendant to stop. The officer ran to the defendant’s car, opened the door, and told the defendant to put his hands on the steering wheel. The defendant momentarily complied, but then put the car in drive and drove around the truck to leave the parking lot. The officer testified the defendant sped off pretty quickly but did not hit either the officer or the blocking truck. The officer went to the address listed from the license plate and found the car partially covered with a tarp. The defendant was home and arrested. The incident was captured by the officer’s body camera and admitted into evidence at trial.

The charge included the additional element that the defendant’s operation of the motor vehicle caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property, elevating the degree of the offense. The jury found the defendant guilty of the offense and the additional enhancement of risk of serious physical harm.

On appeal the court affirmed the conviction for failure to comply with the police order, but held the evidence in the record did not support a finding that the defendant caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property. Although the officer testified the defendant drove off very fast, the officer was not able to approximate the speed. Other officers also failed to determine the defendant’s speed. Arriving at this conclusion, the appellate court noted there was little traffic at the time on a four lane highway with no pedestrians. There was no high speed chase and no evidence that the defendant ran red lights or committed any other traffic violation. (Par. 41).

Based on the evidence the appellate court upheld the conviction, but finding insufficient proof the defendant caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm, amended the conviction from a fourth degree felony to a first degree misdemeanor. The case was remanded to the trial court to re-sentence the defendant for a misdemeanor offence.