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Traffic Signals — May 2025

TRAFFIC SIGNALS NEWSLETTER

Dear Colleagues,June 6, 2025

This newsletter sets out a summary of Ohio court decisions issued last month concerning impaired driving, alcohol and drugs of abuse, and other procedural related issues that may be raised in these cases. While not all of the cases involve impaired driving, they raise pretrial and post-judgment issues that would apply to OVI and vehicular homicide and assault cases.

The case summaries provide recent appellate decisions regarding Ohio law as applied to factual matters as well as interpretations and application of statutes and prior case law. Some cases also set out specific facts situations for determining reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause which may be of assistance when reviewing motions to suppress.

I am grateful to Paul Pfeifer, Trina Bennington, and the Ohio Judicial Conference staff for their assistance in the distribution of the newsletter. Please feel free to contact me with any feedback.

Patrick Carroll, retired judge

Ohio Judicial Outreach Liaison to the ABA

[email protected]

(216) 403-5521

Summary of cases, May, 2025.

Operation and proximate cause

State v. Quinn, 2025-Ohio-158 (6^th. Dist.). Convictions for two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, falsification, OVI, and driving under suspended license were affirmed. The defendant was driving shortly after 10:00 p.m. on I-75 about 83 miles per hour in the center lane. The passenger grabbed the steering wheel, causing the car to swerve left into the concrete center barrier that separates the lanes from oncoming traffic. The car was immobile as a result of the damage. The defendant and passenger left the car on the highway without hazard or headlights on.¹ Less than a minute later the decedent drove head-on into the stopped car. There was significant impact damage to both cars.

When the police arrived, the driver and passenger were asked to give a statement. Due to their shaken condition and the extremely cold weather, they were put in the back of the police car. Both gave statements that the defendant was merging into the right lane when struck by the other car. An independent witness told the police he was in the middle lane of the highway when he passed the dark, disabled vehicle, but could not call the police in time before the collision. Stopping to assist after the collision, he found the defendant and passenger away from the car.

From inside the police car the officer smelled alcohol. Both denied any alcohol or drug use. The officer separated the defendant by removing the passenger from the car but the smell did not dissipate. The officer also noticed the defendant’s bloodshot and droopy eyes. A portable breath test gave a 0.119 result. On the way to the police station the defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol. At the station the defendant refused a breath test. An almost empty bottle of vodka was found in her backpack. A search warrant was obtained and a blood sample from the hospital was drawn at 2:16 a.m.

The blood test results showed a blood/alcohol level of 0.094. The coroner’s chief toxicologist testified, due to average hourly alcohol rate of elimination, blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the crash would likely have been between 0.1248 and 0.1556. (Par. 30). An accident reconstructionist testified that the second car was travelling between 69 and 71 miles per hour, which equates to 100 feet per second. The decedent attempted to brake and was going about 41 miles per hour at the time of impact. Both defendants were convicted of all charges by jury trial.

On appeal the defendant asserted she did not cause the death of another as the proximate result of committing an OVI offense, as set out in R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) because her hitting the concrete center wall was the result of an unforeseeable act, the passenger grabbing the steering wheel, and not her impaired condition. The defendant also asserted she did not operate the vehicle recklessly, as required under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), because her conduct did not proximately cause either collision.

The court noted R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) is a strict liability offense, which negates the prosecution’s burden of proving a mens rea, but the prosecution must still present evidence that the victim’s death proximately resulted from the defendant’s OVI offense. (Par. 51). The court found there was evidence of the OVI offense from defendant’s BAC of .094 four hours after the crash which by expert testimony of reversed extrapolation suggested a BAC level 0.1248 and 0.1556 at the time of the crash. From the testimony the court further noted a BAC of this level depresses the central nervous system and impairs a person's ability to divide attention and to pay attention to the road and surrounding activities. In addition, two of the most common traffic violations that impaired people commit are speed and marked lanes violations which the defendant committed when she hit the concrete wall. (Par. 53).

Regarding the issue of proximate cause, the evidence must show the defendant's conduct 1) was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and 2) there was no other rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. (Par. 54, citations omitted.). The court further noted a defendant could not escape liability merely because factors other than her own acts contributed to the death, so long as those factors were not the sole cause. (Par. 54, citations omitted.). In the present case the court found the prosecution presented evidence regarding the effects that alcohol impairment has on the ability to operate a vehicle. (Par. 56). Specifically, the court noted alcohol 1) depresses the central nervous system, 2) impairs a person's ability to divide attention and pay attention to the road and surrounding activities, 3) slows decision making and decreases reaction time and inhibits gross and fine motor functioning. (Par. 56).²

Prior OVI convictions.

The trial court read the parties stipulation of the defendant’s two prior OVI convictions. After the jury returned guilty verdicts, the trial court asserted the stipulation was a mistake on the grounds the prior convictions were sentencing enhancements and not elements of the offense. On appeal, the court cited State v. Allen, 29 Ohio St. 3d 53 (1987), that it was error to read the stipulation to the jury when the prior conviction was a sentencing enhancement and not an element of the offense. The court in Quinn held, however, that from the evidence presented at trial there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the prior OVI convictions had not been admitted. (Par. 73).

Author’s note. A first offense OVI and an offense with one prior OVI conviction within ten years are first degree misdemeanors. The prior conviction is a sentencing enhancement but does not raise the level of offense. Two prior OVI convictions within ten years, however, changes the level of offense from a first degree misdemeanor to an unclassified misdemeanor. As an unclassified misdemeanor, the penalty increases the maximum incarceration from six months to one year, elevating the OVI to a serious offense. Crim. R. 2(C). Two prior OVI convictions within ten years ais an element of an unclassified OVI misdemeanor. See, State v. Mason, 2025-Ohio-1040 (5^th. Dist.).

Passenger liability

State v. Kinney, 2025-Ohio-1620 (6^th. Dist.). The facts in this case are set out in State v. Quinn, 2025-Ohio-158 (6^th. Dist.). The issue on appeal is whether the conduct by the passenger/defendant grabbing the steering wheel was within the definition of “operation.”

“Operation” and R.C. 4511.19.

The defendant did not dispute she was under the influence of alcohol, that her BAC was over .08, or that her driver's license was suspended. Instead, she challenged that she was operating the vehicle. R.C. 4511.01(HHH) defines “operate” to "to cause or have caused movement of a vehicle." The court found the prosecution presented evidence that the defendant grabbed the steering wheel, causing movement of the vehicle which was sufficient to show the defendant/passenger’s operation of the vehicle. (Par. 62).

“While operating” and R.C. 2903.06.

The defendant was charged with aggravated vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a) (as the proximate cause of an OVI offense) and R.C. 2903.06(A)(2) (recklessly), which requires proof of causing the death of another while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle. (emphasis added). The defendant raised, among other issues, that she was not operating when the collision occurred and the critical issue was the

discernibility of the disabled vehicle, not its operation.

Unlike “operation” there is no statutory definition of “while operating” and the trial court did not define the term to the jury. Regarding the defendant’s assertion she was not operating the vehicle because it was inoperable at the time of the collision, the court held the sequence of events that resulted in the death began while the defendant was operating the vehicle. (Par. 74).

The court relied on and adopted the holding in State v. Miranda, 2014-Ohio-5312 (11^th. Dist.), which similarly involved an intoxicated driver in which the car hit the guardrail and was left immobilized on the highway. The defendant in Miranda left the vehicle and the vehicle was struck moments later by an oncoming car, injuring the other driver. Affirming the vehicular assault conviction, the court in Miranda found the statutory definition of “operation” "encompassed past or completed movement of a vehicle” and included "a situation where the harm is caused by a vehicle rendered inoperable as a result of driving while intoxicated." Miranda at P.21- 22. The court in Miranda upheld the conviction when the actual operation of the motor vehicle has ceased but the harm has not yet occurred, provided that no intervening event breaks the chain of causation". 

OVI Offenses; validity of stop and sufficiency of evidence

State v. Kelly, 2025-Ohio-1689 (9^th. Dist.). An OVI conviction and order overruling a motion to suppress were affirmed. The defendant was stopped by the officer for speeding. The officer testified he originally measured the defendant travelling 94 mph in a 70 mph zone. The officer briefly lost sight of the defendant as the car crested a hill, but regained vision, estimating the defendant going between 82 to 85 mph as the defendant passed other cars. At the stop the officer smelled alcohol from the car. The defendant’s eyes were red, bloodshot, and glossy and his speech was slow, and he spoke as if his tongue was swollen. The officer noted the defendant left the door open after he got out of the car to take the field sobriety tests. From the test results the defendant was arrest for OVI. The defendant submitted to the breathalyzer with a .175 BAC result.

After a hearing and order overruling a motion to suppress, the defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge. On appeal the defendant asserted the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, reasonable suspicion to detain him for field sobriety testing, and probable cause to arrest.

Traffic stop.

A traffic violation creates reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. (Par. 8). The defendant challenged the speeding violation because of the lighting conditions and the temporary loss of vision of his car by the officer. The record showed, however, the dashcam captured the defendant’s vehicle in a well-lit area before the car went into a darker area. In addition, the officer was able to see the defendant’s car pass to other cars on the road, ensuring that the officer was not mistaken about which car was speeding.

Reasonable suspicion for field sobriety tests.

An officer may extend an investigatory stop to conduct field sobriety testing if he develops a reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. (Par. 14, citations omitted). The court noted no single factor is dispositive of whether a law enforcement officer is legally justified in conducting field sobriety tests in any given case. (Par. 14). In the present case the court found there were numerous factors to support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was impaired. Although the defendant attempted to explain some of the factors, reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances at the time. Moreover, a trial court is not required to accept an alternative explanation for any factor. (Par. 20).

Probable cause for arrest.

An officer has probable cause to arrest an individual if he has probable cause if, at the time of arrest, the officer had sufficient facts derived from a reasonably trustworthy source to cause a prudent person to believe the suspect was driving under the influence. (Par. 22, citations omitted). The court found there were a number of physiological factors that indicated impairment, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (6 out of 6 clues), the walk and turn (7 out of 8 clues), and the one leg stand (3 out of 4 clues). Although the defendant claimed the poor test results were due to a medical condition (gout), at the time of the tests he had told the officer of his gout and that he was okay to take the tests. The court also noted the medical condition with his leg would have no impact on the HHGN test. (Par. 26). From all of the defendant’s indications, there was probable cause to arrest the defendant for impaired driving.

State v. Buckingham, 2025-Ohio-1688 (9^th. Dist.). OVI conviction and an order overruling a motion to suppress were affirmed. A passenger in a car called the police because of the car in front was swerving across lanes on the road. The passenger and driver followed the car for about fifteen minutes and provided the defendant’s license plate number to the police. The defendant pulled into a driveway. An officer went to the address and found the described car. The dash lights were still illuminated and the engine was still warm. After the officer knocked on the door the defendant opened the door and stepped out onto the porch. The defendant looked disheveled, had glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, was swaying back and forth, and emitted a strong odor of alcohol. After being arrested for OVI, the defendant submitted to the breathalyzer with a BAC reading of .204. After the hearing in which the motion to suppress was overruled, the defendant entered a no contest to the charge and was found guilty.

On appeal the defendant asserted the officer did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that justified an investigatory stop. Unlike the vast majority of OVI cases, the officer did not stop the defendant after seeing erratic driving. Instead, the officer came to the defendant’s home and the defendant answered the door and "voluntarily stepped outside onto his front porch where he [was] questioned by the police." (Par. 8). The appellate court found the officer did not restrain the defendant’s liberty through physical force or a show of authority. As such, there was no investigatory stop or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

A police officer may make a warrantless arrest for driving under the influence even if the offense was not committed in the officer's presence as long as the officer "has probable cause to believe that the suspect was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs." (Par. 11, citations omitted.). A warrantless arrest in a public place that is based on probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jordan, 2021-Ohio-3922, quoting State v. Brown, 2007-Ohio-4837. (Par. 11). The court found the defendant’s doorway and adjacent porch were a public place and not part of the person’s home. (Par. 11, citations omitted.).

In the present case the court found reliable evidence of probable cause for the OVI arrest by 1) the caller, who gave consistent information about the car weaving, provided her name to the dispatcher, testified during the suppression hearing, described the car's appearance and provided its make, model, and license plate number, and 2) the defendant’s car was still warm when he arrived at the residence and that the dashboard lights were still illuminated, and 3) the defendant’s impaired appearance.

Traffic stops and community caretaker function

State v. Logan Acres, 2025-Ohio-1592 (9^th. Dist). An order overruling a motion to suppress and OVI conviction were affirmed. The officer drove behind a parked truck on the side of the road with hazard lights flashing at 12:50 a.m. The defendant was the only occupant in the car. He told the officer he pulled to the side of the road to talk with his father because he had learned his grandfather had passed away. As she got near the defendant the officer immediately smelled alcohol and noticed the defendant’s eyes were “exceptionally glassy.” She also saw an open container of an alcoholic beverage on the back floor of the truck. The defendant initially denied drinking any alcohol, but after confronted with the open container, he told her he had been drinking earlier at a graduation party. The defendant was asked to get out of the car to perform field sobriety tests. From the results of the test, the defendant was arrested for OVI. The defendant submitted to a breath test with a 0.138 BAC result.

After a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court granted the motion as related to the one leg stand and horizontal gaze nystagmus tests, but denied the remainder of the evidence sought to be suppressed. The defendant entered no contest pleas to two OVI counts, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) [operating a vehicle under the influence] and R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) [operating a vehicle with a prohibited BAC], which were merged for sentencing, underage possession, and open container.

Stop and initial encounter.

The court found on appeal when the officer approached the truck she was engaged in a community caretaking function which is an exception to the Fourth Amendment. The community caretaking function permits police officers to stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an immediate need for their assistance to protect life, prevent serious injury, or enhance public safety. (Par. 17). From the evidence in the record the court concluded the officer was engaged in a community caretaking function as it was reasonable to believe the truck was disabled or the occupant needed assistance. (Par. 20).

Reasonable suspicion to detain.

An officer may not prolong a stop for purposes unrelated to the original purpose of the stop unless there is reasonable suspicion that would justify further detention. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015). To conduct field sobriety tests, an officer only needs a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts, not probable cause, indicating that the driver may be committing a criminal act. (Par. 21, citations omitted). Relying on State v. Corn, 2022-Ohio-3095 (9^th. Dist.), the court held a community caretaking stop can be converted to a criminal investigation when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer determines a reasonable suspicion to investigate possible driver impairment. (Par. 25-26).

Walk and turn test.

The defendant had a visible face injury and told the officer he had been assaulted earlier that evening. The defendant asserted the walk and turn test was not properly given because the officer did not inquire about a possible head injury. The court found, based on the officer’s testimony and corroborating video from the dash cam that the test was administered in substantial compliance with the NHTSA standards. In addition, the officer asked the defendant prior to the test if the defendant had recent injuries, including head injuries, that would prevent him from walking the line on a normal day. The defendant denied being in any pain, needing medical assistance, or provided any information to indicate he could not perform the test.

Speed violation issues

State v. Clark, 2025-Ohio-1886 (9^th. Dist.) Speeding conviction was affirmed. (2-1 decision). The defendant admitted he was traveling at 80 mph in a 60 mph zone.

A speeding offense for a speed of 80 mph may be based on 1) exceeding the speed that is "reasonable or proper” under R.C. 4511.21(A)(2) exceeding 70 mph under R.C. 4511.21(D)(4), or 3) exceeding the posted speed under R.C. 4511.21(D)(5). The defendant disputed there was a posted sign in the area where he was speeding. The appellate court found, however, that the officer’s testimony that there were signed in the area, but could not remember exactly where, was sufficient. Moreover, the lack of a sign in this one area does not establish that there was no sign posted in the area where he was driving before he was observed speeding.(Par. 9).

The dissent noted that under R.C. 4511.24(D)(5), the posted speed limit sign was an element of this offense and the prosecution must prove the posted speed limit sign was in the proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person. R.C. 4511.21(A). The dissent asserted that the statement by the officer was not sufficient to meet this requirement.

State v. Rochon, 2025-Ohio-1715 (6^th. Dist.). An order overruling a motion for limited driving privileges was affirmed. The defendant was found guilty of reckless operation of a motor vehicle and speeding, being stopped for travelling 110 MPH in a 55 MPH zone. The court on appeal noted R.C. 4510.021 gives the trial court discretion when deciding to grant limited driving privileges. State v. Uliveto, 2018-Ohio-1364 (5th Dist.). (Par. 7). On appeal the court found in light of the excessive speed in this case and the defendant’s fifteen prior speeding citations, the denial of limited driving privileges, including occupation driving, was not an abuse of discretion.

Probable cause for stop.

Driving over sidewalk.

State v. Fulton, 2025-Ohio-1707 (11^th. Dist.). An order granting a motion to suppress in felony drug trafficking case was reversed. Leaving the Taco Bell at 1:14 a.m., the defendant was stopped by the officer as the defendant drove over the sidewalk to stop the car before entering the road. There were no stop signs or other signs by the sidewalk. The incident occurred in a known drug area. The witnessing officer called another officer in the area who stopped the defendant for the traffic violation. No traffic citation was issued.

Although the defendant denied any drugs in the car, methamphetamine were found in the defendant’s backpack. The officer also found marijuana that was not purchased by the defendant from a dispensary. On appeal from granting the motion to suppress, the appellate court noted

R.C. 4511.431(A) requires a driver to stop before crossing the sidewalk. A stop based on a traffic violation is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment even when no citation is issued. (Par. 15). Any ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity does not undermine the validity of the stop. (Par. 15,  Dayton v. Erickson, 1996- Ohio 431).The court also noted that when an officer makes a traffic stop at the request of another officer, it is the knowledge of the requesting officer that determines the presence of articulable suspicion or probable cause. (Par. 16, citations omitted).

No turn signal when changing lanes

United States v. Vann, Case No. 24-3315, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11318, 2025 WL 1342324 (6^th. Cir. 2025). An order overruling motion to suppress traffic stop was affirmed. As the defendant passed the officer on the highway, the defendant slowed down below the speed limit. The officer followed the car for a short time and saw the defendant change lanes without using a turn signal. The officer got behind the car, but the other car moved to a different lane. The defendant was stopped for not using a turn signal when changing lanes. When the officer approached the car he could smell a strong marijuana odor. A dispensary bag was located in the car door.³

The defendant told the officer he bought the marijuana from a dispensary in Michigan. The defendant did not have a medical marijuana card. Due to the location of the marijuana bag, the defendant and the passenger were searched. Marijuana, other cannabis products, needles, and Narcan were found in the passenger’s purse. Various pills, fentanyl, and a plastic bag with a large amount of crystal meth were found in the car. Both were arrested for drug possession.

At the suppression hearing the officer asserted two bases for the traffic stop, not signaling when changing lanes and impeding traffic by slow speed. The trial court found probable cause based on the turn signal violation but expressed no opinion on the impeding traffic charge as it was not included in the officer’s report.

On appeal the defendant did not dispute the turn signal requirement when changing lanes, but asserted the officer could not see the defendant’s car when changing lanes. The assertion was based on the dashcam video in which the turn signal light was blocked by another car between the defendant and the officer. The prosecution introduced photographs showing the officer’s line of sight which included the turn signal light, even though not captured on the video. The appellate court found consistent and contemporaneous evidence that the officer saw the defendant fail to use his turn signal.

Burnt out license plate light

State v. Pullom, 2025-Ohio-1701 (3^rd. Dist.). A conviction for cocaine possession and order overruling a motion to suppress were affirmed. The defendant was initially stopped for a rear license plate light that appeared to be burned out. As the officer turned around to follow the car, the defendant sped up exceeding the 25 mile per hour speed limit. After the stop, the officer observed the defendant’s eyes were "red and glassy" with constricted pupils and there was an odor of an alcoholic beverage from the car. The defendant consented to a portable breathalyzer which gave a reading in excess of the legal limit. After field sobriety test were administered, the defendant was arrested for OVI. Cocaine was found on the defendant when arrested. With the discovery of the cocaine on the defendant at the time of the OVI arrest, the defendant was only indicted on the drug charge.

The basis of the stop was the license plate light and excessive speed. The motion to suppress challenged the officer’s credibility based on discrepancies between his testimony and the dashcam video and lack of radar to verify the speed. Regarding the speed, the court noted "[a] visual estimation of a vehicle's speed can constitute reasonable and articulable suspicion." (Par. 21, citation omitted.). The court also found that although the officer’s testimony in some respects conflicted with the video evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err by finding that the stop of the vehicle for the speed violation was based on reasonable, articulable suspicion.  (Par. 22).

Missing rear view mirror.

State v. Pullom, 2025-Ohio-1700 (3d. Dist.).⁴ A conviction for cocaine possession and order overruling a motion to suppress were affirmed. The defendant was stopped for a missing passenger side rear view mirror which the officer thought was a local ordinance violation. The officer was familiar with the defendant and conducted a pat down for weapons for the officer’s safety. During the pat down with an open hand, the officer felt a baggie containing a rock-like substance in the defendant’s pocket. A motion to suppress both the traffic stop and the cocaine was overruled and the defendant entered a no contest plea to the cocaine charge.

Traffic stop

The defendant asserted the local ordinance did not require a passenger side mirror, but only required a clear and unobstructed view of the rear and both sides of the vehicle. Because he had a rearview and driver’s side door mirrors, the defendant argued his view was not obstructed and therefore, not in violation of the ordinance. Rejecting this position, the court of appeals held that from the officer’s perspective the missing passenger-side mirror could raise reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant did not have a clear and unobstructed view in violation of the ordinance. (Par. 20). In addition, the officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law can constitute reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.  State v. Mayo, 2023-Ohio-124 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Kirkpatrick, 2017-Ohio-7629 (1st Dist.). (Par. 21). The court found any mistake by the officer that a passenger side mirror was required did not render the initial traffic stop an unconstitutional seizure. (Par. 21).

Terry Stop & Plain Feel

A pat down for officer safety  search must be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). (Par. 24, other citations omitted.) When, however, an officer is conducting a lawful weapons pat down and detects an object that has features making its criminal character 'immediately apparent,' the contraband may be seized without a warrant pursuant to the plain feel doctrine. The detection of any contraband does not involve any invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons. (Par. 24, citations omitted.)

The court found the officer had the authority to conduct a pat down of the defendant to ensure that he was not armed and the officer did not exceed his authority by removing the drugs from the defendant’s pocket. (Par. 27). The officer testified he was familiar with narcotic and removing the suspected narcotics from the defendant’s pocket fell within the plain feel exception. (Par. 28).

Loud muffler and detention due to unrelated warrant

State v. Matics, 2025-Ohio-1588 (5^th. Dist.). A conviction for aggravated drug possession and an order overruling a motion to suppress were affirmed. The defendant was stopped for a loud and defective muffler. Neither the defendant/driver nor the passenger had a valid driver’s license. Confirming the identities, both occupants had outstanding warrants. Both occupants were removed from the car and a pat down was conducted for weapons. Although the defendant refused consent to search his wallet, the officer checked the wallet which contained methamphetamines. The defendant was detained pending confirmation of the warrants. After notice that the defendant was outside the warrants’ pickup radius, the defendant was cited for driving under a suspended license and released.

On appeal the defendant did not dispute the traffic stop, but claimed it was improperly extended. The scope of a Terry pat-down is narrow and permits an officer "to conduct a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of a police officer, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime". Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 27 (1968). The pat down cannot be employed to search for evidence of a crime and must be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer". Terry, 392 U.S. at 29; State v. Scasny, 2004-Ohio-4918. (Par. 14).

In the present case the court determined that search of the wallet was proper as an

exception of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, and not based on a Terry pat down. (Par. 17). A search incident to arrest need not be supported by independent probable cause to believe the arrestee has a weapon or evidence of a crime on his person. Moreover, by taking the defendant into custody, the officer was required to check the wallet for a knife or other contraband.

The court noted when an officer receives information that an outstanding arrest warrant exists, the officer may arrest or detain the individual even if the information turns out to be erroneous, provided that the officer had no information suggesting that the warrant was improperly issued or otherwise invalid. (Par. 20, 26). In this case the court noted the search of the defendant’s wallet occurred prior to the officer being informed the defendant was outside the pickup radius. As such, the search was incident to a valid arrest.

Author’s Note: The pickup radius of an arrest warrant is normally set by law enforcement after the warrant is issued unless otherwise specified by the court. As the court noted in Matics, the radius is often determined by fiscal restraints and policies of various police departments. (fn. 3). There are generally five pick up radiuses, 1) nationwide, 2) within the state of Ohio, 3) within 100 mile radius or some other geographic distance, 4) adjacent to county where warrant was issued, and 5) within the county only. Other pick up radiuses may also apply. The pickup radius is a procedural mechanism for the execution of the warrant and does not affect the validity of the warrant.

Venue

State v. Holloway, 2025-Ohio-1637 (1^st. Dist.). OVI conviction affirmed. A village police officer saw the defendant speeding in Cincinnati. As the defendant left the city and entered the village within the officer’s jurisdiction, the speed increased to 45 MPH in a 25 MPH zone. The officer also saw the defendant make a turn without a signal. After stopping the car the officer approached the driver. Although the driver’s window was only lowered about an inch, the officer smelled alcohol from the car. The officer observed the defendant had glossy eyes and slurred speech. The defendant had trouble getting out of the car and needed the officer’s assistance. The defendant denied having drank any alcoholic beverage.

The defendant refused all field sobriety tests. While in the back of the police car, the officer noted a strong alcohol odor. The defendant was arrested and charged with OVI, driving with a suspended license, improper turn signal, and speeding. After a bench trial the defendant was found guilty of all charges.

Sufficiency of evidence to support OVI conviction.

The defendant asserted on appeal that there was no evidence of consumption or erratic driving. The court noted, however, that the prosecution was “not required to establish that a defendant was actually impaired while driving, but rather, need only show an impaired driving ability." (Par. 11, citations omitted.). To prove impairment, the prosecution may rely upon "physiological factors such as slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and the odor of alcohol." (Par. 11). The appellate court also noted that “any lay witness, without special qualifications, may testify as to whether or not an individual is intoxicated.” (Par 11, citations omitted.).

The court found even without any erratic driving or field sobriety tests, evidence of the strong smell of alcohol from the defendant, glossy eyes, slurred speech,  agitation, two separate traffic violations, and the officer’s extensive experience with OVI investigations was sufficient to support the OVI conviction. (Par. 12-13).

Venue.

At the trial the officer did not specifically testify that the offenses occurred in the village where the defendant was arrested and charged. "Although it is not a material element of the offense charged, venue is a fact which must be proved in criminal prosecutions unless it is waived by the defendant." State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90 (1981). The prosecution need not prove venue in express terms so long as it is established by all the facts and circumstances in the case. (Par. 15, citations omitted.). Although evidence showing that an offense occurred at a particular street, standing alone, is generally insufficient to prove venue, a street name when combined with other location testimony may be sufficient to establish venue. (Par. 16, citations omitted.). In the present case the officer’s testimony of street names at intersections where the traffic violations occurred was sufficient to establish venue.

Walking in roadway and traffic stop.

State v. Beal, 2025-Ohio-1666 (5^th. Dist.). A conviction for failure to disclose personal information after being stopped walking in the roadway was affirmed. The defendant was seen walking in the middle of the road in heavy fog at 4:00 a.m. After being advised he was walking illegally in the road, the defendant refused to provide any identification. When arrested, the defendant identified himself.

On appeal, regarding the stop R.C. 4511.50(A) prohibits walking on the road when a sidewalk is available and practicable. With the availability of a sidewalk in this case, there was violation of R.C. 4511.50(A) giving a reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. (Par. 20, citation omitted.). The officer was permitted to lawfully stop the defendant to investigate the behavior and potentially issue a citation.

State v. Williams-Stupp, 2025-Ohio-1815 (2d. Dist.). An order overruling a motion to suppress and convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and violating a protection order were affirmed. While on patrol in a “high crime” area, the officer saw the defendant improperly crossing the street mid-block between two intersections. The officer testified the defendant was looking behind in a suspicious manner and the officer saw a gun sticking out of the defendant’s pocket. The officer relayed the information to other officers in the area. One of the other officers, Detective Orndorff, saw the defendant “jay walk” a second time on another street. Baes on the information provided, a third officer stopped the defendant. The gun was taken and the defendant arrested.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress. After the hearing concluded, the defendant filed objections on hearsay grounds that the arrest was made from information about jay walking seen by an officer who did not testify at the hearing. Due to this issue, the trial court re-opened the hearing specifically for Detective Orndorff to testify and be subject to cross examination. Detective Orndorff appeared at the second hearing and explained the defendant’s conduct. After the second hearing, the motion to suppress was overruled. The defendant entered no contest pleas to the two charges and was found guilty.

Supplemental suppression hearing.

The defendant asserted the trial court “lost any semblance of impartiality when it injected itself into the case by helping the State meet its burden of proof at the suppression hearing by ordering an additional hearing and additional testimony.” (Par. 18). Rejecting this argument, the appellate court noted Evidence Rule 614 permits a judge on its own motion, to ask questions and call witnesses as long as the court 1) maintains its impartiality, 2) does not assume the role of an advocate, and 3) does not prejudice the rights of the defendant to a fair and impartial trial. (Par. 19, citations omitted.). When there are factual issues not clear from the evidence, the trial court does not abuse its discretion for other evidence to get to the truth of a critical fact. This includes re-opening the case for a supplemental evidentiary hearing when necessary.

In the present case the court called the witness, but let the parties question and cross examine the witness. The judge asked no questions of the witness. The appellate court held the supplemental hearing was for the benefit of the defendant who was questioning the testimony of the other officer.

Reasonable suspicion and pedestrian violations.

Each officer testified that they saw the defendant jay-walk which was the basis for the stop. R.C. 4511.48 defines jaywalking as crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection and not yielding the way to vehicles on the road. The defendant argued there were no other cars on the road, so his conduct was not in violation of R.C. 4511.48.

The appellate court agreed the defendant’s conduct was not jay walking, but held it was in violation of a local ordinance that prohibited walking on a street or road when there was an available sidewalk. See, R.C. 4511.50(A). Notwithstanding the characterization of the defendant’s conduct the court held it was in violation of the ordinance and therefore, provided a valid basis to stop the defendant. (Par. 31). Moreover, the court found the existence of reasonable suspicion by evaluating the totality of the circumstances, which also included the possession of the firearm and the defendant’s suspicious behavior.

Probation conditions, no-alcohol and no-entry-into bars restrictions

City of Conneaut v. Pushic, 2025-Ohio-1783 (11^th. Dist.). Probation conditions for two convictions of leaving the scene of a collision to complete drug and alcohol assessment and barring entry to any bars or other liquor establishments was affirmed on appeal. The defendant left his club around 6:00 p.m. on July 4^th and backed into a Ford Explorer. Pulling forward, he hit a Toyota Highlander. Both cars were parked. The Ford sustained considerable damage and unable to be driven. The defendant left the scene without giving any information. The incident was captured on the club’s surveillance video. The bartender was able to identify the defendant to the police. According to the police they were unable to locate the defendant because he left for New York.

The defendant entered no contest pleas to the two charges of leaving the scene, found guilty with the reckless operation charge was dismissed. The defendant was given a 180 day suspended jail sentence with two years’ supervised community control supervision (“CCS”). The conditions were:

1. Not commit another criminal or traffic offense within two years;

2. Complete a Driver's Intervention Program ("DIP") in lieu of three days jail;

3. Obtain a comprehensive Diagnostic assessment for alcohol and substance abuse;

4. Not purchase, possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage or drug of abuse or any pseudoephedrine product, and

5. Not go to any bar or liquor establishment.

On appeal the defendant disputed the length of suspended jail term and the CCS conditions.

Length of suspended jail sentence.

The defendant asserted the suspended jail sentence was too extreme for misdemeanor offenses and an improper interpretation of the misdemeanor sentencing guidelines. (Par. 14). The defendant asserted the crash occurred on private property, the vehicles were unattended, there were no injuries, and he has a good driving record. On appeal the court noted R.C. 2929.21 provides the overriding purposes of misdemeanor sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others and to punish the offender. The trial court has discretion to determine the most effective way to achieve these purposes and principles of sentencing . R.C. 2929.22(A). The trial court is required to shall consider all of the factors contained in R.C. 2929.22(B)(1)(a)-(g) as well as other factors that are relevant to the specific case. (Par. 17). Affirming the sentence, the appellate court held the sentence was within the statutory limits and based on the facts of the case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

CCS conditions

The defendant asserted the CCS conditions were improper because the defendant was not charged with OVI and there was no evidence of alcohol involved in the offenses.⁵ CCS conditions are valid when they are “reasonably related to the probationary goals of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and insuring good behavior” and are not overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge upon the probationer's liberty. State v. Bourne, 2023-Ohio-2832 (11^th. Dist), citing State v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888.

In the present case the court noted the severity of the collision, leaving one car disabled, the time the defendant left the club, and his identification by the bartender. Citing State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-725 (5^th. Dist.), in which the court upheld no-alcohol and no-entry-into bars restrictions as a condition of probation in an assault case that did not directly involve alcohol, the court in this case found the CCS conditions imposed did not rise to the level of plain error.

Probation revocation

New OVI conviction

State v. Barone, 2025-Ohio-1695 (12^th. Dist.). Probation revocation for OVI conviction while on probation for prior OVI conviction was affirmed. The defendant was found guilty of OVI and placed on probation for two years, up through April 26, 2024. At a subsequent meeting the probation officer mistakenly gave the defendant notice that the probation period expired on year earlier, on April 26, 2023. On April 5, 2024 the defendant was arrested for another OVI offense. A notice of the probation violation based on the new arrest and failing to notify the probation department was issued on April15, 2024. While the violation was pending the defendant filed a motion for early termination. The motion was overruled and the defendant was found to be in violation of probation conditions.

On appeal the defendant asserted “de facto” termination of probation based on the incorrect date given by his probation officer. In rejecting this argument, the court noted “a sentencing court retains jurisdiction over the offender for the duration of the period of community control”. R.C. 2929.25(B). (Par. 11). Jurisdictional limitations are predicated on the expiration of the imposed term of community control and  a trial court loses jurisdiction to impose a sentence if "the state fails to initiate probation violation proceedings during the original probation period." (Par. 12, citations omitted.).

The appellate court held there was no support in Ohio law for the concept of "de facto termination." (Par. 13). Under R.C. 2929.25, the trial court, not the probation department, has the authority to terminate community control and a probation officer's clerical error indicating an earlier termination date cannot override the court's lawful judgment entry. (Par. 13). The court found the trial court considered the probation officer’s error, distinguishing between noncompliance with probation conditions and the commission of a new criminal offense which is a legal obligation that existed independent of his probation status. (Par. 13). Affirming the probation violation, the appellate court found there was a reasonable exercise of the trial court's discretion, not an arbitrary or unconscionable attitude.

Continued drug use

State v. Stookbury, 2025-Ohio-1883 (9^th. Dist.). An order revoking community control supervision was affirmed. The defendant was charged with a fourth degree felony OVI offense, (4^th. offense in 10 years). The defendant entered a no contest plea to an amended unclassified misdemeanor (3^rd OVI offense in 10 years). The defendant was given a jail sentence of 365 days with 350 suspended and three years community control supervision. The defendant was required to obtain a drug/alcohol assessment and follow treatment directives. While on probation, the defendant tested positive for alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine, as well as a criminal charge in Pennsylvania for drug possession. The defendant admitted the violation and the balance of the jail sentence was imposed.

On appeal the defendant asserted he was not properly advised of the potential penalty that could be imposed for a probation violation. The court held, however, that the defendant did not appeal the original judgment, only the probation revocation, and therefore, the arguments are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The concurring opinion pointed out that although the charge was reduced to an unclassified misdemeanor, the trial court relied on the statutory framework for a felony sentence. As the concurring opinion noted, the unclassified OVI misdemeanor caries the same maximum one year penalty as a fifth degree felony.

Different procedures apply depending on whether the offense is classified as a felony or misdemeanor, even though both carry a possible one year term of incarceration. As a misdemeanor, the trial court is not required to inform a defendant at the time of a plea of the maximum potential penalty. Crim. R. 11(D) and (E). With a felony the trial court required to notify the defendant of the maximum potential penalties. Crim. R. 11(C). Due to this requirement, failure to inform the defendant of the maximum potential penalty is grounds to vacate the plea. (Par. 18, citation omitted.). Although the same possible maximum penalty, the defendant pleading to an unclassified misdemeanor has fewer protections that if he plead to a fifth degree felony. (Par. 19).

State v. Masters, 2025-Ohio-1763 (2d. Dist). An order revoking community control supervision was affirmed. The defendant had been convicted of aggravated drug possession

and placed on three years’ community control supervision. Conditions of supervision included no “purchase, possession, use or have under her control any narcotic drug or other controlled substance or illegal drugs, including any instrument, device or other object used to administer drugs or to prepare them for administration, unless lawfully prescribed for her by a licensed physician.” (Par. 2). Four months after being sentenced, a notice of violation was issued stating that the defendant used methamphetamine and fentanyl as well as possession drug paraphernalia.⁶

The defendant admitted the violation and entered a no contest plea to the new drug charge with the prosecutor’s recommendation to continue community control supervision with additional drug treatment. Upon review of the PSI and report of new conviction, probation was revoked and the defendant was remanded to serve out the prison term. The court also imposed a prison term on the new drug conviction to be served concurrently.

“The right to continue on community control depends upon compliance with the conditions of community control and is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Par. 8, citation omitted.) In the present case the court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking community control supervision. The appellate court noted that in addition to continued drug use, the defendant violated other supervision conditions, including continued contact with prohibited persons. Moreover, the record showed the defendant had not responded favorably to previous court-ordered substance abuse treatment programs. (Par. 11).

Regarding the prosecutor’s recommendation, upon which the defendant claimed she relied, the appellate court stated “It is well established that trial courts may reject plea agreements and . . . are not bound by a jointly recommended sentence.” (Par. 14, multiple citations omitted.).⁷  The court held “the trial court was free to reject the State's recommendation for community control and, under the circumstances of this case, did not abuse its discretion by doing so.” (Par. 14).

State v. Helton, 2025-Ohio-1945 (2d. Dist.). An order revoking community control supervision on felony drug conviction for continued drug use and imposing incarceration was affirmed. The defendant was placed on two years community control supervision with conditions prohibiting drug use and enrolling in treatment program, among other conditions. The defendant did not report to the probation officer as required and when arrested on the warrant for nonappearance, was in possession of methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance. The arrest also gave rise to a new, separate criminal charge.

On appeal, the court held the violations were non-technical under R.C. 2929.15 because the violation 1) consisted of a new criminal offense and 2) the defendant’s continued drug use, disregarded treatment plan, and failure to report for over six months showed the defendant had abandoned the objects of the community control conditions. As such, the trial court was not limited to a ninety day period of incarceration by R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) but instead could impose the balance of the original sentence.

Miscellaneous

Untimely motion to suppress

State v. Medley, 2025-Ohio-1754 (5^th. Dist.). An order denying a motion for leave to file an untimely motion to suppress was affirmed. The defendant was stopped for following another vehicle too closely. At the stop the officer noticed an odor of alcohol from the defendant as well as slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and shaking hands. Field sobriety tests were given with the results of four out of six clues on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, five out of eight clues on the walk-and-turn test, and two out of four clues on the one-leg stand test. The defendant told the officer she had taken suboxone earlier that day and a “sip” of alcohol later that evening. There was a container of vodka in the car which the defendant stated she had forgot about. The defendant submitted to the breathalyzer with a 0.086 BAC result. The defendant was charged with two OVI counts, child endangerment due to an underage passenger in the car, and following a vehicle too closely. The defendant ultimately entered no contest please to one OVI charge and the child endangering.

The issue on appeal was the denial of the defendant’s leave to file an untimely motion to suppress. Defense counsel filed motions to continue the final pretrial and trial date twice. Although the time to file a motion to suppress had expired by Criminal Rule 12(D), the defense counsel indicated he intended to file leave for an “MTS.” Continuing the second trial date, the court required the defendant to file a motion for leave ASAP and the motion for leave would be addressed at that time. The motion was filed eight days later.

Criminal Rule 12(H) permits an untimely pretrial motion for good cause. “Good cause” includes delay by the prosecution to provide discovery to the defendant, new defense counsel, suppression issues that could not be raised until after the deadline, and the trial had not been scheduled. (Par. 22, citations omitted). None of those situations occurred in the present case. Citing State v. Bower, 2010-Ohio-4420 (5^th. Dist.), a trial court does not abuse its discretion to deny an untimely motion to suppress when the motion is based on discovery that was timely provided by the prosecutor. (Par. 18). In this case discovery was timely provided to the defendant, including the officer’s video which was the basis for the motion to suppress. The appellate court held the reason for delay did not establish good cause and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.

Author’s Note: Although a low BAC, the evidence showed recent suboxone use. Suboxone contains buprenorphine which helps to reduce withdrawal symptoms and cravings associated with opioid dependence. Alcohol and buprenorphine are both central nervous system depressants, when taken together can cause increased drowsiness, dizziness, sedation, and impaired cognitive functions. 

Denial of motion to certify conflict on explanation of circumstances.

State v. McBride, 2025-Ohio-1911 (7^th. Dist). A motion to certify conflict regarding explanation of circumstances for OVI conviction was overruled. The defendant argued that the decision in this case was in conflict with State v. Scudder, 2025-Ohio-1267 (1^st. Dist.).⁸ The court in McBride noted that the waiver of circumstances was by written waiver. In Scudder the prosecution argued the explanation of circumstances could be implicitly waived. In Scudder, however, the case was reversed because the prosecutor read the police report into the record as the explanation of circumstances, but the report did not cover all of the elements of the offense. The court also noted that the cases differed based on factual, not legal issues and therefore, not appropriate for certification as a legal conflict.